oliver v. u.s. extended authority to include fields posted with what?

U.S. legal dominion allowing warrantless searches of private belongings not almost houses

The open-fields doctrine (also open-field doctrine or open-fields dominion), in the U.Southward. law of criminal procedure, is the legal doctrine that a "warrantless search of the area outside a belongings possessor's curtilage" does non violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, "unless there is some other legal basis for the search," such a search "must exclude the home and any bordering country (such as a k) that is inside an enclosure or otherwise protected from public scrutiny."^[ane]

History [edit]

The open up fields doctrine was first articulated by the U.Due south. Supreme Court in Hester v. United states,^[two] which stated that "the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open fields."^[3] This stance appears to be decided on the basis that "open fields are not a "constitutionally protected area" because they cannot exist construed as "persons, houses, papers, [or] furnishings."

This method of reasoning gave way with the arrival of the landmark case Katz v. United States,^[4] which established a ii-function test for what constitutes a search inside the pregnant of the Fourth Amendment. The relevant criteria are "outset that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, 2nd, that the expectation be i that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable'."^[5] Nether this new analysis of the Fourth Amendment, a search of an object or area where a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy is, in a legal sense, not a search at all. That search, therefore, does not trigger the protections of the Fourth Amendment.

In Oliver v. United States,^[6] the Supreme Court held that a privacy expectation regarding an open field is unreasonable:

… open up fields do non provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance. There is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields.^[7]

Distinguishing open fields from cloister [edit]

While open fields are not protected by the Quaternary Amendment, the curtilage, or outdoor area immediately surrounding the domicile, may be protected. Courts have treated this surface area equally an extension of the business firm and as such discipline to all the privacy protections afforded a person's home (unlike a person's open fields) nether the Fourth Amendment. An area is curtilage if it "harbors the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a human's home and the privacies of life."^[eight] Courts brand this conclusion by examining "the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included inside an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken past the resident to protect the expanse from observation past people passing by."^[nine] Theoretically, many structures might extend the curtilage protection to the areas immediately surrounding them. The courts take gone then far as to care for a tent as a home for Fourth Amendment purposes in the past.^{[10] [11] [12]}

Despite this rather broad interpretation of curtilage, the courts seem willing to find areas to be exterior of the curtilage if they are in any style carve up from the abode (by a fence, great distance, other structures, even certain plants).^[13]

Rejections of doctrine by country courts [edit]

Since Oliver, the highest courts of Montana, New York, Oregon and Vermont, besides as a Washington state appeals court, take held that the open up-fields doctrine does not use in those states due to their state constitutions granting greater protections to citizens (nether dual sovereignty a country may grant its citizens more rights than those guaranteed in the federal constitution). Since Katz grounded privacy in persons rather than places, they argue, landowners who have taken affirmative steps to exclude the public such as fencing or posting the bounds affirm a privacy involvement sufficient to prevail over any warrantless search of the belongings where mutual exceptions such every bit hot pursuit and evidently view practise non apply. Some of those opinions take been critical of not only Oliver just Hester.

In a 2017 concurring opinion where the doctrine did not come into play in overturning a Wisconsin farmer's convictions for threatening two state game wardens he believed had been illegal hunters trespassing on his land, Justice Rebecca Bradley of that state'southward Supreme Court was highly critical of it.^[14]

State v. Dixson [edit]

State v. Dixson
Court	Oregon Supreme Courtroom
Full case name	State of Oregon v. Theresa Dixson, Jeffrey Digby and Lorin Lou Dixson
Decided	20 Dec 1988 (1988-12-twenty)
Commendation(s)	766 P.2d 1015, 307 Or. 195
Case history
Prior activity(southward)	Country v. Dixson et al, 740 P.second 1124, (Or.App., 1987)
Appealed from	Oregon Court of Appeals
Court membership
Approximate(s) sitting	7
Instance opinions
Decision by	West. Michael Gillette
Keywords
Search Seizure

Within a twelvemonth of Oliver, deputy sheriffs in Coos County, Oregon, followed up on a tip that marijuana was existence grown on a local lumber company'due south land. Afterwards flying over the property in question and observing possible groves of the institute, then seeing a truck carrying water onto the holding via a private access road, the deputies followed the road, by a cable stretched beyond it, signs prohibiting hunting on the holding, and a felled tree, past which they had to proceed on pes to a habitation at the center of the twoscore acres (16 ha) of forest. From the dwelling they were able to see cannabis planted 800 anxiety (240 chiliad) abroad, outside the curtilage of the business firm. The couple who were in the process of ownership the property, and a friend who was helping them abound the plants, were arrested and later convicted of manufacturing and possessing a controlled substance.^[15]

Oregon Courtroom of Appeals [edit]

The appeals court reversed the conviction after hearing the entreatment en banc in 1987. "The decisive outcome is non, every bit the trial courtroom apparently idea, one of federal law", Judge Thomas Young wrote for the plurality. "Whether defendant's land is constitutionally protected depends, in the kickoff case, not on Us Supreme Court cases interpreting the Fourth Subpoena, but on the basic principles underlying the Oregon Constitution ... we demand not bring together the federal retreat from the constitutional requirements."^[16]

"[D]oes the constitution protect belongings as holding, or is its protection of belongings a means to a greater finish?" Young asked. The majority believed the answer was the latter, to which Young cited writings of William Pitt, 1st Earl of Chatham, who strongly supported the colonists in the years before the American Revolution, in support of their understanding of this concept of privacy: "The poorest homo may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown." The U.S. Supreme Court had also recognized "the indefeasible right of personal security" every bit what is most breached past a search in its 1886 Boyd case.^[17]

Oregon'due south Supreme Court had, since 1931, recognized this equally a privacy interest, Young wrote, and as he found little guidance in federal privacy cases beyond the instant bug of those cases, the majority looked to Oregon instance police force as it had interpreted Article I, Section 9, of the state constitution, the counterpart to the Fourth Subpoena. Immature found Katz 'southward two-role test unhelpful and flawed: "The proper question, thus, is non what the defendant expects or whether that expectation is reasonable but whether the constitution protects the accused."^[a] In this case, Young concluded, the deputies had trespassed on the Dixsons' land and violated their privacy.^[eighteen]

Judge John Buttler wrote a special concurrence for himself and 2 colleagues, reaching the aforementioned determination every bit the plurality just basing it on different logic which he felt was more in compliance with state Supreme Court precedent: "I would hold that, if it is necessary for the officers to trespass on property not within the curtilage in order to detect the activeness or contraband in question, there is an unreasonable search and, therefore, any ensuing seizure would exist unlawful." In the instant instance, Buttler said that information technology had, as one of the deputies had testified that he and his partner had at all times believed they were on the lumber company'south property and would non have entered without a warrant or permission had they known they were not.^[nineteen]

Judge George Van Hoomissen wrote one of 2 dissents, taking issue with every aspect of the plurality opinion—arguing that at that place was no evidence that the framers of the state constitution had intended it exist read more literally, that the appeals courtroom was ignoring earlier precedents that had explicitly adopted the open-fields doctrine, that the defendants had not raised a trespass merits against the deputies at trial, and that courts in other states with similar constitutional language had found it compatible with the doctrine. "[T]he plurality has hopelessly confused ramble police with the civil and criminal police of trespass [and] ... substitutes its ain social theories for the plain significant of the specific constitutional text", he wrote. Van Hoomissen likewise noted that if the plurality needed guidance as to whether the citizens of Oregon had embraced an expectation of privacy around growing marijuana, the failure of a 1986 ballot mensurate that would accept decriminalized the drug suggested otherwise.^[twenty]

A shorter dissent was written by Guess Kurt Rossman, joined by Mary Deits. While he agreed with the plurality that the land constitution was non meant to be read in a narrowly literal manner, and with the special concurrence'due south criticism of the plurality's condone of precedent, he believed that the defendants had non established that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy, since the signage that the deputies passed simply said "No hunting" rather than "No trespassing" and the felled tree merely signaled an intent to deter vehicles, not pes traffic; thus the deputies could reasonably take believed they were still on lumber company land. "It is unnecessary to sail into uncharted waters past formulating a new, untested constitutional analysis, as the plurality and special concurrence accept done."^[21]

Oregon Supreme Courtroom [edit]

Prosecutors appealed the case to the Oregon Supreme Court, which heard arguments in March 1988 and returned its decision at the end of the year. Writing for a unanimous courtroom, Justice West. Michael Gillette affirmed the lower court's belongings that Commodity I, Section nine provided broader privacy protection than the Fourth Amendment and thus the open-fields doctrine did not apply in state prosecutions.^[22]

After reviewing the facts of the example and all the appellate court's opinions, Gillette considered all the arguments. The two cases Van Hoommissen had pointed to as precedent adopting the open-fields doctrine were actually not dispositive of the issue, since one had involved a search on public land and the other appeared to rely on circumstances unique to that case. In another of its own recent holdings, he noted, the state Supreme Courtroom had also rejected Katz' 'south reasonable expectation test, so in the instant instance the courtroom could consider the issue without relying on it.^[23]

Gillette rejected the textualist interpretation of the constitutional linguistic communication that had been held by the Supreme Court and other states' courts to support the doctrine for iii reasons. First, the court'southward own prior holdings recognized Article I, Section 9, as establishing a wide privacy interest beyond those items specified in information technology. Second, the Supreme Court had itself admitted in Katz that in extending privacy protection to the user of a phone berth it was going beyond any possible significant of "persons, houses, papers and effects", every bit Justice Thurgood Marshall had noted in his Oliver dissent. Lastly, Gillette noted, if read literally the Fourth Amendment as well as Oregon's constitution would take simply protected citizens in their own houses, and not in any other buildings. "If the individual has a privacy interest in state outside the curtilage of his dwelling, that privacy interest will not go unprotected but because of its location."^[24]

Next, Gillette turned to the claim that mutual law recognized a stardom between the cloister of a business firm and the property as a whole. In Hester, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes had cited William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, a common reference for English common law, in property this distinction originated at that place. Simply Gillette quoted the passage Holmes had cited, in which Blackstone discussed what constituted burglary under common law, to cast dubiety on Holmes' interpretation, noting that Blackstone had included all the possible outbuildings as places where unlawful entry and theft could be punished every bit burglary. Blackstone'due south chapter on trespass likewise specifically mentioned a human being'due south land as legally protected. "Reliance on the mutual-law concept of cloister to justify excluding land exterior the curtilage from the protections of either constitutional provision is misplaced", Gillette concluded."^[25]

Lastly Gillette rejected the state'southward argument that whether land outside curtilage was covered by its owner's privacy involvement depended on how that state was used. It depended, he wrote, on whether the owner had taken steps to exclude intruders, such equally putting upwardly fences or posting the bounds. "Allowing the police to intrude into individual land, regardless of the steps taken past its occupant to keep information technology individual, would exist a significant limitation on the occupant'due south freedom from governmental scrutiny."^[26]

From this Gillette derived a "simple and objective" rule: "A person who wishes to preserve a constitutionally protected privacy involvement in state outside the cloister must manifest an intention to exclude the public by erecting barriers to entry, such as fences, or by posting signs." He then applied the dominion to the instant instance and plant that it did not apply to the Dixsons since the signs they had posted on the route to their house barred simply hunting. "There was no objective reason for the officers to believe that ... other uses such equally hiking were forbidden" since it was mutual in Oregon for those uses to accept place on large tracts of privately endemic land where it was not expressly forbidden. Therefore, having affirmed the appeals court's rejection of the open-fields doctrine, the state's Supreme Court reversed information technology on the specific issues of the example and affirmed the conviction.^[26]

State v. Kirchoff [edit]

State v. Kirchoff
Court	Vermont Supreme Court
Decided	25 Jan 1991 (1991-01-25)
Citation(southward)	156 Vt. 1, 587 A.2d 988
Courtroom membership
Judge(s) sitting	Allen, Peck, Dooley, Morse, Springer (specially assigned)
Case opinions
Decision by	Morse
Concurrence	Springer
Dissent	Peck
Keywords
search seizure

A example that had begun earlier Oliver provided the Vermont Supreme Court with its opportunity to consider the open-fields doctrine near a decade later. In 1982 Robert Kirchoff bought a 39-acre (16 ha) package in the town of Lincoln, Vermont, posted it and filed a notice to that outcome with the town clerk. He allowed some of his neighbors to ride their bicycles on trails that crossed the property, only otherwise did not let any admission.^[27]

Kirchoff had been living at that place for 4 years when the Addison County sheriff received a tip that he was growing marijuana on his land. The sheriff and another law enforcement officer went to a neighboring firm, crossed a fence, and followed an old logging road past some quondam "no trespassing" signs. They left the route and found the growing cannabis plants in the woods roughly 100 yards (91 m) from his business firm, invisible from the road.^[28]

The sheriff called in ii other officers to keep an eye on the marijuana while they got a search warrant. Kirchoff went out to tend them at this point, and admitted to the officers that he had been growing them. When the sheriff returned, he and the police seized the plants and other prove of the grow operation from Kirchoff's house.^[28]

At trial, Kirchoff moved to have the prove obtained from the search suppressed. It was denied, and he was bedevilled. He appealed to the state's Supreme Courtroom.^{[28] [b]} The case was not argued until 1989, and information technology took an additional two years for the court to make up one's mind.^[29]

In early on 1991 the Supreme Court issued its decision, belongings 4–1 that the show should have been suppressed. Afterward reviewing the facts of the case, Justice James L. Morse conceded that the search was lawful nether Oliver. Nevertheless, the courtroom went on to annotation that it had to consider whether the search complied with Article 11 of the land constitution, which while essentially similar to the Fourth Amendment did have some differences in wording. Most significantly, information technology referred to a person's "possessions" as coming under its purview rather than just their "effects".^[30]

Did that hateful it applied to all a person's landholdings, Morse asked? The minimal records from the country's original constitutional debates did not offer much guidance, so he looked at how other states with like language had addressed the issue. They had divided on the issue, yet at the same time states that used "furnishings" in their constitutions had held it applied more than broadly than Oliver had held.^[30]

"Our decision, however, demand not residual on the drafters' choice of one discussion over some other", Morse wrote. "Even if we cannot say with confidence that the telescopic of the term 'possessions' mandates a right of privacy in real estate, it certainly does not dominion out such a correct." He noted that this interpretation was at odds with Oliver, and said the fault lay with the Oliver Court, which had "misinterpreted its ain Quaternary Subpoena precedent."^[thirty]

In Oliver, the Supreme Court had seemed "to equate privacy with offense", which Morse considered flawed. "If one assumes at the outset that people will but seek privacy in the use of their land for criminal purposes," he wrote, "the conclusion that gild will not recognize a claim to privacy in the land readily follows. But we cannot presume how an individual will apply private lands—that is the nature of privacy." Oliver 'southward clan of privacy and criminality, according to Morse, was an ipse dixit.^[31]

Morse accustomed the Oregon Supreme Court'south dominion in Dixson that the open-fields doctrine did not apply where a landowner had, like Kirchoff, taken affirmative measures to control access to their land. He grounded this in state constitutional and statutory provisions that allowed public use of unposted state for many outdoor recreational activities and express the liability of landowners for damages suffered by those they allowed, fifty-fifty implicitly, to appoint in those activities on unposted land. "These provisions prove the country's policy of providing the public with certain privileges and liberties not permitted nether the common law", he wrote. "They testify no intent, however, to limit the right of landowners to pursue their affairs costless from unregulated intrusion by officials."^[32]

Lastly, Morse said that while the Vermont Supreme Court was not completely discarding Katz as the basis for its personalty-rooted concept of privacy, it plant some problems doing then. It was not comfortable with the concept of a reasonable expectation, since that could too hands change "with political winds and the perceived exigencies of the day ... The question is not what society is prepared to accept but what the constitution requires." This formulation, Morse believed, would better protect people'south privacy expectations as applied science avant-garde. Lastly he placed the burden of proof on the state in cases where a search such every bit the ane in the instant case, was challenged as unconstitutional, and held that under that standard this search had violated the state constitution.^[32]

There were ii other opinions. Commune Judge Lewis Springer, specially assigned to sit on the courtroom for this instance due to a vacant seat, concurred simply said the majority opinion should have more than thoroughly grounded its arguments in the state's ramble history rather than the federal constitution.^[33] Louis P. Peck, in one of his last opinions before retirement, dissented at length, attacking and ridiculing the majority for judicial activism in an stance rife with cultural and literary references.^[34]

Dissent [edit]

"I am sadly disappointed, and frustrated across comfort", past the majority opinion, Peck began. He likened it to a brief for the defendant in the example. "[I]t is, in my judgment, one of the most upshot-oriented opinions I have e'er been exposed to. I am not prepared to countenance in silence the extreme and unwarranted judicial activism of which the opinion is an example."^[34]

Peck suggested that the bulk'southward defoliation over the meaning of "possessions" in the land constitution was "a calculated tactic rather than the result of interpretive incompetency ... Disregarding a word considering it may accept different meanings in dissimilar contexts constitutes an argument weak to the point of absurdity." By doing so, he charged, the majority had been able to substitute its own meaning. If that had not been the plan, "I am afraid that the majority's training in elementary logic, if any, failed to penetrate or brand a lasting impression. The[ir] reasoning is a syllogistic blunder and a non sequitur."^[34]

In that location was no constitutional problem presented past the instance, Peck said; the state's existing laws were enough protection for landowners.

For all realistic and applied purposes, the sole beneficiary of today's conclusion is the possessor of open up fields who conducts criminal activity thereon in disobedience of the law. In brusque, the bulk has given birth to a correct of privacy to commit crime. If our marijuana farmers have the skilful sense I recall they have, they will soon exist decorated every bit petty bees putting upwardly no-trespassing signs, while laughing up their sleeves at the gullible naivete of the cooperative majority.

The insistence that police needed a warrant to search any posted or fenced land due to the state'due south trespass laws was, Peck wrote, "like saying a law cruiser, in responding to an emergency call, may not exceed the speed limit because there are laws against speeding."^[34]

Returning to the bulk's apparent confusion over the meaning of "possessions", Peck said it was insulting to the framers of the Vermont Constitution to suggest that they "simply tossed in words willy-nilly with no intent that they have whatsoever detail significant; but filling in blanks, as it were, with the showtime give-and-take that came to mind." He believed that they chose their words advisedly and would not have expected the level of protection the court was giving landowners.^[34]

Peck also called the bulk'due south belongings that the search was unconstitutional "a grossly unfair example of police-bashing", that he himself took personally.

The constabulary are not psychic. At the fourth dimension they entered the open up fields portion of accused's property, they had no way of knowing or of anticipating that this Courtroom would follow, sheep-like, the decision of one of the most activist-oriented amid the country courts,^[c] or that we would reject a opposite determination by the high court of a land which borders us and is far more similar to united states of america in size and other characteristics than the former^[d] ... I would remind the bulk, as information technology sheds its tears for the defendant, that the entry was not capricious. It was not an afternoon of sport for the police, on the off-hazard they might just happen to stumble on marijuana or some other contraband, in much the aforementioned spirit that we hunt deer and other game. The entry was undertaken in reliance on a "tip"; with every reason to believe the search was legitimate, and it was washed in adept religion.

Peck feared that the majority'southward decision would unnecessarily handicap the state's police in preventing crime. He accused it of "cho[osing] the possible prestige with which it may be honored by police reviews and other constitutional activists amidst the courts, and legal writers, to a recognition of the rights of the individual inhabitants of the State of Vermont." At the very to the lowest degree, the majority should have held the effect to be decided on a instance-past-case basis rather than establishing a coating rule.^[34]

People v. Scott [edit]

People v. Scott
Court	New York Court of Appeals
Full case proper noun	People of the State of New York v. Guy Scott
Decided	2 April 1992 (1992-04-02)
Citation(southward)	79 N.Y.2d 474
Case history
Prior action(s)	Conviction affirmed, 169 A.D.2d 1023 (1991)
Appealed from	New York Supreme Court, Appellate Sectionalization, 3rd Dept.
Court membership
Judges sitting	Kaye, Alexander, Titone, Hancock, Bellacosa, Wachtler, Simone
Case opinions
Decision by	Hancock
Concurrence	Kaye
Dissent	Bellacosa
Keywords
search seizure

As the Dixson entreatment was being considered by the Oregon courts, across the land, a hunter pursuing a wounded deer onto posted private property in Preston, New York, came across what appeared to him to be the remnants of a marijuana growing operation. In July 1988, he returned, and confirmed his suspicions, finding about 50 cannabis plants being grown on the site, guarded by an armed human being. He reported this to the state police, who asked him to bring back a leaf from 1 of the plants. The adjacent calendar month he did, and after testifying in camera he returned with a detective.^[36]

Guy Scott, possessor of the 165 acres (67 ha) on which the marijuana was growing, was arrested and charged with first-caste criminal possession of marijuana, a felony, after 200 plants were seized. At trial in Chenango County Court, he moved to suppress the evidence against him every bit seized unconstitutionally. After the court ruled that information technology had not been, Scott pleaded guilty and appealed the conviction on the same grounds, arguing that by posting the belongings'due south bounds at 20–30-foot (6.ane–9.1 1000) intervals he had secured a reasonable expectation of privacy.^[36]

Following Oliver, a five-justice console of the 3rd Section of the state'due south Appellate Segmentation unanimously rejected that argument in 1991. "The marihuana in question hither", information technology wrote, "was clearly grown in an open, uncultivated field abroad from the curtilage of any residential structure; thus, defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy."^[36] Scott appealed to the Court of Appeals, New York'southward highest courtroom.^[37]

In 1992, Estimate Stewart Hancock wrote for the majority in a 4–3 conclusion reversing the appellate court and Scott's conviction that rejected the open up-fields doctrine. Like Marshall and Oregon's Dixson court, he found Oliver 's recourse to a property-based privacy interest at odds with Katz 's reasonable expectation test. But that would take lilliputian bearing as the bulk found New York's constitution, "with its own unique history", more relevant to the issues raised by Scott's instance.^[38]

Prior to 1938 New York, Hancock noted, had restricted searches and seizures simply at the statutory level. When the state constitution was amended that year, in addition to language similar to that of the Quaternary Amendment that had long been in the statute, it included a provision explicitly including telecommunications under the same warrant requirements, a reaction to the U.S. Supreme Court'southward Olmstead instance a decade earlier, which had held that police did non need a warrant for wiretapping telephones since that took place far from the belongings of those communicating over them. Therefore, according to Hancock, it did not follow that the land constitution should or could be interpreted in the same manner the Oliver Court had interpreted the federal constitution.^[38]

Hancock turned to the second part of the Katz exam: whether Scott's involvement in his privacy asserted by posting his belongings was objectively reasonable. The Oliver bulk had dismissed the idea, pointing instead to social consensus as where to await, merely, the approximate wrote:

We believe that nether the police of this State the citizens are entitled to more protection. A constitutional rule which permits Country agents to invade private lands for no reason at all — without permission and in outright condone of the possessor's efforts to maintain privacy by fencing or posting signs — is one that we cannot accept as adequately preserving fundamental rights of New York citizens.^[38]

While Hancock conceded that property rights exercise not automatically create a privacy interest, his review of the country's statutory and case constabulary convinced him that, in interpreting both country and federal law on this issue, the country'southward courts had constantly followed the Katz concept of rooting privacy in the person, rather than belongings. He also shared Marshall's observation that the Oliver majority had suggested that a reasonable expectation of privacy depended on what the landowner intended to shield from view past posting or fencing the land:

The reasoning of the ... bulk, seems, to be this, in effect: that law-abiding persons should have nothing to hide on their property and, thus, there can exist no reasonable objection to the State's unpermitted entry on posted or fenced land to conduct a general search for contraband. But this presupposes the ideal of a conforming club, a concept which seems foreign to New York's tradition of tolerance of the anarchistic and of what may appear bizarre or fifty-fifty offensive.^[39]

Judge Joseph Bellacosa's dissent, addressing not only Scott but a companion case in which the court had ruled bear witness gathered in warrantless administrative searches of businesses to be inadmissible, focused largely on what he considered to exist the majority's faulty reasoning for parting from Oliver. In a similar example of a rural marijuana grower four years earlier,^[e] he noted, the court had accepted evidence gathered past an aeriform search and declined to consider the same privacy issues that defendant had raised.^[40] The majority responded that in that case she had not raised the consequence of her land being posted.^[41]

Land five. Johnson [edit]

State 5. Johnson
Courtroom	Washington Court of Appeals, Division Two
Total case name	State of Washington five. Tamara Sue Johnson and James Raymond Johnson
Decided	vii September 1994 (1994-09-07)
Commendation(s)	75 Wn. App. 692, 879 P.second 984
Case history
Prior activity(s)	criminal trial
Appealed from	Thurston County Superior Court
Appealed to	Washington Supreme Court
Subsequent action(south)	Review denied, 126 Wn.2d 1004 (1995)
Case opinions
Alexander
Court membership
Judges sitting	Alexander, Morgan and Houghton
Case opinions
Decision by	Alexander
Keywords
search seizure

Again, equally Scott was reaching the New York Court of Appeals, another marijuana growing investigation across the land again gave rising to a land court's rejection of the open-fields doctrine. This case involved the additional question of whether federal involvement negated any land consideration of the issue.^[42]

In 1991 agents of the federal Drug Enforcement Assistants (DEA) received a tip that a "Jim Johnson" was growing marijuana on his holding almost Scott Lake. The two took this information to the Thurston County Narcotics Task Forcefulness, and a detective helped them ostend that a homo by that name lived in the area, and institute his address. However, the only way to reach the property was via a dirt road that ran through Millersylvania Country Park.^[42]

The three went downwardly the road but found information technology gated, fenced and posted at the property line, and they chose at that time not to pass it, unable to see any evidence of marijuana being grown from where they were. At the DEA agents' request, the county officers flew over the property and took photographs. Several days later the DEA agents returned, without the local detective, in the middle of the nighttime. This time they passed the gate and walked 200 yards (180 k) to a barn, with a house visible about 75–100 yards (69–91 m) beyond, where they smelled growing cannabis plants and heard the sounds of mechanism they associated with such tillage operations. They completed their investigation by aiming a thermal imaging device at the befouled; its results farther confirmed their suspicion. Later finding from local utility records that the property'southward electricity consumption also matched the profile of a growing operation, they got a warrant and arrested both Johnson and his wife.^[42]

Although the DEA had gathered well-nigh of the bear witness against them, the couple were prosecuted in country courtroom. They sought unsuccessfully to suppress that evidence, but the trial court held that the DEA had largely been acting independently of the land, making the testify admissible under the open-fields doctrine. The courtroom convicted them in a bench trial and they appealed.^[42]

The Washington Court of Appeals start reconsidered the trial court'south ruling that the DEA acted without the cooperation or aid of the state, which nether the silverish platter doctrine would have protected it from being challenged under the state constitution. Gauge Gerry Alexander rejected the land'due south argument that the local officers had only provided the DEA with locally relevant information, noting that a county detective had accompanied the DEA agents on one trip, the aeriform surveillance and the involvement of local law enforcement in the arrest. And since the country was so involved, the courtroom could consider whether the evidence was gathered in violation of the state constitution.^[43]

Washington's equivalent to the Quaternary Amendment, Article I, Section 7, is unlike New York and Oregon'south very differently worded from its federal counterpart: "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his domicile invaded, without authority of law." Information technology had thus, Alexander wrote, been held repeatedly to offering broader protection to privacy rights.^{[44] [f]}

The state had argued that the DEA agents had, past using an accessway to the house, complied with that provision, citing several precedents where searches had been upheld where police used routes for the public to approach a residence. Simply Alexander distinguished them from the instant case past noting that "hither ... [the agents] were using it as the nearly convenient route on which to trespass on the Johnsons' belongings" instead of trying to reach the house and speak with its occupants; the fact that the agents intruded tardily at night in 1 argued confronting that, the guess observed. The posting, fencing and gate also indicated that "the Johnsons withdrew any permission that arguably may be implied for the DEA agents to use the accessway, especially at 1 a.g."^[46]

Alexander conceded that the barn was non inside the curtilage of the house, but over again felt that was outweighed past the visible measures the Johnsons had taken to exclude the public from their property. This was not just an event of privacy, Alexander noted, simply the safety of law enforcement. Justice Thurgood Marshall'south dissent in Oliver had noted that many rural landowners resorted to "self-aid", as he put information technology, when faced with trespassers, and the DEA agents' furtive nocturnal visit to the Johnsons' barn could have resulted in violence. "Nosotros conclude that the agents' entry onto the Johnsons' property was an unreasonable intrusion into the Johnsons' private diplomacy", Alexander wrote. Since the remaining untainted evidence submitted to obtain the search warrant was thus insufficient to plant likely crusade, the Johnsons' convictions were reversed with directions to dismiss the charges. The state Supreme Court declined to review the case the next year.^[47]

State v. Bullock [edit]

Land 5. Bullock
Court	Montana Supreme Court
Total case proper noun	Land of Montana v. Nib Bullock and Eddie Peterson
Decided	4 August 1995 (1995-08-04)
Citation(s)	901 P.2d 61
Case history
Prior activity(s)	criminal trial and appeal
Appealed from	District Court for the 10th Judicial District
Instance opinions
Trieweiler
Court membership
Judges sitting	Trieweiler, Turnage, Nelson, Gray, Hunt, Weber and Leaphart
Instance opinions
Decision by	Triweiler
Keywords
search seizure

Contemporaneously with Johnson, another case involving the open-fields doctrine began working its manner through Montana'due south state courts. Unlike its land and federal predecessors, it involved illegally taken game rather than marijuana cultivation.^[48]

In October 1991, Chuck Wing, a Boulder, Montana, man saw a six- or seven-signal balderdash elk on a loma as he was returning from work. He knew that these elk could simply exist taken by hunters with special permits in that surface area. As he was watching he saw two men shoot the elk and put it in their truck, which he knew belonged to a human being named Eddie Peterson, without field dressing it. Wing reported it to Jefferson County Sheriff Tom Dawson, which in turn passed the information to the land Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks (MFWP).^[49]

Chris Anderson, an MFWP game warden came from nearby Helena to Boulder the next forenoon and interviewed Wing. Anderson learned that Peterson lived in nearby Basin Creek, and he and Dawson drove to his motel, down a 7-mile (11 km) one-lane Woods Service road bordered by individual property in some stretches, with signs advising the public to stay on the road. At Peterson'southward business firm, the gate to his driveway was open, and the sheriff and game warden drove past an open gate, with "No trespassing" signs on either side, down a 334-foot (102 m) road to Peterson's motel, which he had in the past moved behind a rise in the land then that it would non be visible from the road.^[49]

Anderson and Dawson saw an elk carcass hanging from a tree roughly 125 anxiety (38 m) from Peterson'south cabin, likewise invisible from the road or adjoining property. Anderson asked where the elk had been killed, and Peterson took the 2 there, just while there were some of the animal'south innards at that place were no tracks. Anderson believed the elk had been taken somewhere else, and told Peterson what Fly had told Dawson about seeing the twenty-four hours earlier.^[50]

Peterson connected to insist that the elk had been taken on his belongings, which Anderson did not believe. Beak Bullock, who was too on the belongings, attempted to corroborate Peterson'due south business relationship even when offered immunity from prosecution if he told Anderson what the game warden believed had actually happened. The side by side day Anderson returned to the belongings and confiscated the elk. Peterson was charged with unlawfully killing a game animal and Bullock with possessing an unlawfully killed game creature.^[50]

The two men's trial took nearly of the next year. In February 1992 the county Justice Court granted their motility to suppress all the testify that Anderson and Dawson had obtained when they went on Peterson's property, dismissing entirely the example against Bullock in the process. The state appealed to District Court, and asked for a new trial; the defendants in plow asked that the charges be dismissed because they were misdemeanors and more than six months had elapsed since they had been charged. After that move was denied, they pleaded guilty and, in October, appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.^[fifty]

The Supreme Courtroom sent the case back down for evidentiary hearings and imposition of sentence, proceedings that took place over the side by side two years.^[l] After they had been held, the justices heard arguments in early 1995 and rendered their conclusion in August.^[48] They considered three issues: the delay in trying the men, whether Bullock had standing to challenge the evidence against him obtained from the warrantless search of Bullock'south property, and whether the land constitution'southward privacy provisions precluded the open-fields doctrine.^[49]

On the first question, Justice Terry Due north. Trieweiler held for a unanimous courtroom that the 6-month deadline had not been passed due to the country's appeal that granted a trial de novo, and nonetheless the delay had not been presumptively prejudicial.^[51] The next question was resolved in Bullock'southward favor as the courtroom held that its own prior precedent, and a similar case from New Jersey,^{[one thousand]} that anyone charged with an criminal offence alleging possession of something automatically has standing to challenge the seizure and any prove derived from it, regardless of some other contempo U.S. Supreme Courtroom decision that had narrowed the scope of a similar longstanding dominion of its own.^{[h] [52]}

Having established that both defendants had standing to claiming the state's evidence as unconstitutionally gathered, Trieweiler turned to that final question. Since the U.Southward. Supreme Court's recent decisions on the open-fields doctrine had revealed "what announced to be seeming inconsistencies", he believed information technology was proper for the court to reconsider whether it was expert law in Montana. Later retracing its history at the federal level, Triweiler turned to the state's cases, where cases that had upheld the doctrine after Katz but before Oliver and Dunn had upheld it. He believed that the instant case, however, could exist "factually distinguished" from those precedents, where the court had non considered the defendants' expectations of privacy over their open fields to exist reasonable due to the circumstances of those cases.^[53]

Precedent also held that while the linguistic communication of Article II, Department 11, in the Montana Constitution was, similar the corresponding provisions of New York and Oregon's, similar to the Fourth Amendment, information technology guaranteed broader protections confronting unlawful search and seizure. Trieweiler looked at the Oregon, New York and Washington cases. He found that the mutual element was that the defendants had taken steps to exclude all members of the public relieve those they invited onto the land, by posting, fencing or otherwise limiting admission to the property.^[54]

"Nosotros conclude that in Montana a person may accept an expectation of privacy in an surface area of state that is beyond the curtilage which the society of this State is willing to recognize as reasonable, and that where that expectation is evidenced past fencing, 'No Trespassing,' or similar signs, or 'by some other means [which] indicate[south] unmistakably that entry is non permitted'", Trieweiler wrote, quoting Scott. He explicitly excluded cases, such as some of the precedents he had discussed, where law enforcement had observed the illegal activity from adjoining public property, but declared that to the extent those cases relied on the open-fields doctrine they were overruled.^[55]

Having rejected the open-fields doctrine for Montana courts every bit a general principle, Trieweiler turned to its applicability to the instant case. He noted that non only had Peterson posted the belongings and placed a gate at the archway road, he had some years beforehand moved his cabin to a less visible location after repeated vandalism. On previous visits, law enforcement had requested his permission to come on the property. "The entry onto Peterson's property and ascertainment of the elk carcass, which could not take otherwise been observed, was an unreasonable search in violation of Article Two, Department 11, of the Montana Constitution", Triweiler ended.^[55]

Trieweiler rejected the state'due south argument that Peterson's offer to lead Anderson and Dawson to the purported kill site and permission for them to examine the elk constituted sufficient consent to let the carcass into bear witness as those actions only took place subsequently the sheriff and warden had already trespassed far enough on to the property to see the carcass. The courtroom affirmed the district courtroom's denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss, simply overruled its decision non to suppress the prove from the search.^[55]

State 5. Stietz [edit]

Country v. Stietz
Court	Wisconsin Supreme Court
Total example name	State v. Robert Joseph Stietz
Decided	thirteen June 2017 (2017-06-xiii)
Citation(southward)	895 Due north.W.2d 796, 375 Wis.2d 572, 2017 WI 58
Case history
Prior activeness(southward)	Criminal trial
Appealed from	Wisconsin Courtroom of Appeals
Example opinions
Trial court erred in not permitting self-defence jury instruction in prosecution of farmer for armed confrontation with DNR game wardens on his property where they could not and did not clearly identify themselves as wardens and could have been seen by him as trespassers. Appeals court reversed and remanded
Courtroom membership
Judges sitting	Abrahamson, Grassl Bradley, Kelly, Roggensack, Ziegler, Gableman
Case opinions
Determination by	Abrahamson
Concurrence	Bradley, Kelly, Roggensack
Dissent	Ziegler, Gableman
Keywords
search seizure self-defense trespass

... [I]mportant practical considerations suggest that the law should not be empowered to invade land closed to the public. In many parts of the country, landowners feel entitled to utilise cocky-assist in expelling trespassers from their posted holding. There is thus a serious hazard that law officers, making unannounced, warrantless searches of 'open fields,' volition become involved in violent confrontations with irate landowners ...^[56]

The scenario Justice Marshall feared in his Oliver dissent came to pass in Lafayette County, Wisconsin, in 2012. Near dusk on the last Lord's day of November, the last day of the land'due south firearm deer season, Robert Stietz, a cattle and mushroom farmer, went to patrol a detached 25-acre (10 ha) parcel of his land off state Highway 81 for illegal hunters and vandals, both of which he had had problems with in the past. He carried both his rifle and a pistol, and drove to the holding in his wife's sedan since he did not expect to be bringing a deer carcass home. For the same reason, he wore camouflage and no blaze orange.^[57]

At the same time, unbeknownst to Stietz, two game wardens with the country's Department of Natural Resources were patrolling the area in their vehicle, looking for hunters who might exist trying to take a deer after the official cease of the flavour, twenty minutes afterwards sunset, which that day was 4:45 p.thou. But before 5, they institute the sedan parked aslope the highway. In it they observed an open and empty gun case, a bottle of aroma-killing spray and a cover-up tree seat, all of which led them to deduce that the occupant of the machine was probably hunting. The machine's registration came dorsum to Stietz when they checked it on their vehicle'south computer.^[57]

The wardens decided to investigate. They parked their pickup truck, put on their own blaze orange jackets, on which their departmental insignia was not as conspicuous every bit it had been on their uniform shirts, and establish the open cattle gate leading on to Stietz's holding. Presently after they passed it, Stietz himself saw them and approached them, believing from the bonfire orange jackets that they were possibly trespassing hunters.^[58]

At trial, the wardens testified that they identified themselves equally such upon seeing Stietz; he in turn said they did non practice so clearly enough for him to hear and believed they were asking if he was a warden or had seen whatever. The wardens asked how many deer he had seen that solar day; afterward Stietz said he had seen 7 does just was not at the time hunting, he testified that i of the men threw up his arms and seemed upset, which led him to further believe they might be trespassing.^[58]

Noticing that the wardens seemed to be trying to interpose themselves between him and his car, Stietz said, he began to feel fearful. One asked him if his rifle was loaded; when Stietz confirmed that it was the other asked him for it, several times, leading Stietz to believe he was beingness attacked. The two wardens then attempted to take the rifle, leading to a physical struggle betwixt them and Stietz. When they regained their feet, one of the wardens pulled his handgun and pointed it at Stietz, who in turn did the same, followed by the other warden.^[58]

Ane of the wardens fabricated a radio call for fill-in, at which point Stietz said later that he began to realize who they really were and relax slightly. He kept his gun pointed at the wardens, he testified, because they refused to lower theirs. Somewhen deputy sheriffs came and, later on assuring Stietz he would not be "gang tackled", took him into custody.^[58]

Stietz faced vi felony charges over the incident. At trial in March 2014, the jury convicted him of two: intentionally pointing a firearm at a law enforcement officer and resisting an officeholder with a dangerous weapon. His pretrial motions for jury instructions on self-defense, trespass, and violation of his right to keep and carry arms were denied, as were his mail service-trial motions for acquittal or a new trial.^[59]

In May Stietz was sentenced to a year in prison house and probation. The day of sentence, he filed his appeal, arguing the denial of his jury instructions constituted fatal fault. In an unpublished 2016 per curiam opinion, the appeals court upheld the confidence.^[59]

Stietz appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. It accustomed the example in belatedly 2016 and heard oral arguments early the next year. In June 2017, by a 4–2 margin,^[i] the court held that the trial courtroom'south denial of Stietz'due south requested self-defense instruction had deprived him of a factual apparent argument that the jury could have believed and reversed and remanded the appeals court.^[60]

Justice Shirley Abrahamson's majority opinion declined to accost the proposed trespass educational activity since she believed Stietz might well prevail on retrial with just the self-defence force instruction. But the land had raised the open-fields doctrine in its briefs on the case, which led Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley to write a concurrence, joined in its entirety by Justice Daniel Kelly and partially past Primary Justice Patience D. Roggensack,^{[61] [j]} which argued that Stietz had a ramble correct to raise the trespass issue and that not allowing him to do and so violated that right. She likewise was sharply critical of the open-fields doctrine every bit used to justify the testify backside the arrest.^[61]

In her arguments that the trespass instruction should have been permitted, Bradley had noted that at oral argument the state was unable to cite whatsoever statutory authority for the wardens' presence on Stietz's property,^[k] nor bear witness that they had Stietz'south permission. She did not believe the parked car constituted reasonable suspicion of illegal hunting that would take immune them to enter the property, either. And he had put up articulate signals—the posting, gating and fencing of the property—that no one was to come on that belongings without his permission.^[62]

In the absence of those more specific justifications, the land had cited the open up-fields doctrine as to how the wardens' uninvited presence on public land was legal. "The state is wrong", Bradley wrote. "The open up fields doctrine does non transform private fields into public places that anyone is free to enter uninvited or without reason. Nor does it convert the act of trespassing into a lawful intrusion." It existed, she asserted, but to forestall the suppression of testify gathered by intrusions into the areas it covered, and could not be extended to justify Stietz's arrest. "The open up fields exception to the Fourth Amendment'southward warrant requirement was non intended to eliminate property owners' rights by sanctioning entry onto open state at whatever time for any reason, or no reason at all", she reiterated, citing Bullock, Dixson, Johnson and Scott in a footnote.^[62]

Dissenting justice Annette Ziegler wrote for herself and Michael Gableman. She primarily took upshot with the majority opinion, primarily arguing that the wardens did have reasonable suspicion and legal authority to enter the property. She touched on the open-field doctrine only to note that the appeals court had held it applicative, and Stietz had not raised it on his appeal to the Supreme Courtroom.^[63]

Following the decision, Assemblyman Adam Jarchow and State Senator Dave Craig introduced a bill that would require that DNR wardens take reasonable suspicion of a law beingness broken before entering private holding without the owner's consent. "Preventing poaching is somehow and so of import we allow DNR incursions on private property for any reason under the dominicus or no reason at all", Jarchow complained. "[S]omething is seriously out of whack here."^[64] It was vigorously opposed by wildlife conservation organizations such as the League of Conservation Voters and the state Sierra Order chapter, who feared that information technology would severely hamper the wardens' ability to do their jobs,^[65] and was never brought to a vote.^[66]

In his 2018 retrial, Stietz pleaded guilty to a single count of restricting or obstructing an officeholder and was sentenced to time served. He filed suit in 2019 confronting the two wardens alleging they violated his rights under the Second and Fourth amendments; it is currently pending in federal court for the Western District of Wisconsin.^[67]

Encounter likewise [edit]

• Usa v. Burton, 894 F.2d 188 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 857 (1990)
• U.s. 5. Footstep, 955 F.2d 270 (fifth Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.South. 883 (1992)
• Married man v. Bryan, 946 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1991)
• United states of america 5. Benish, 5 F.3d 20 (3d Cir. 1993)
• United States v. McKeever, 5 F.3d 863 (fifth Cir. 1993)
• United States v. Brady, 993 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1993)
• United States five. Depew, eight F.3d 424 (9th Cir. 1993)
• United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271 (second Cir. 1996)
• Kyllo 5. United states, 533 U.Southward. 27 (2001)

Notes [edit]

1. ^ Accent in original
2. ^ Vermont has no intermediate appellate courts
3. ^ Dixson
4. ^ Peck was referring to State 5. Linder, in which the Supreme Court of neighboring New Hampshire had five years previously held the open up-fields doctrine applied in that state.^[35]
5. ^ People v. Reynolds , 71 N.Y.2d 552 (Northward.Y. 1988).
6. ^ In a 1984 example upholding the conviction of a marijuana grower based on warrantless aerial surveillance, Washington's Supreme Court had rejected the open up-fields doctrine in dictum for this reason, but did not find it necessarily to rule on that question since it was not dispositive of the case.^[45]
7. ^ New Jersey v. Alston , 88 Northward.J. 211 (N.J. 1981).
8. ^ United States v. Salvucci, 440 U.S. 83 (1980)
9. ^ Justice Ann Walsh Bradley did non participate.^[60]
10. ^ Roggensack did not bring together Part II of Bradley'southward concurrence, which dealt with the open-fields doctrine.^[61]
11. ^ Wisconsin law permits wardens to enter private belongings without permission or reasonable suspicion only to collect beast carcasses and forbid the spread of disease, none were nowadays or argued to be. The country also argued that the wardens were executing a Terry stop, but those can only be constitutional on public state

References [edit]

1. ^ Black'south Police force Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), open up-fields doctrine
2. ^ Hester five. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
3. ^ Hester, 265 U.Southward. at 57.
4. ^ Katz five. U.Due south., 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
5. ^ Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
6. ^ Oliver v. U.s., 466 U.Southward. 170 (1984).
7. ^ Oliver, 466 U.Southward. at 179.
8. ^ U.s. v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987).
9. ^ Dunn, 480 U.Due south. at 301.
10. ^ U.s.a. five. Gooch, six F.3d 673 (ninth Cir. 1993).
11. ^ LaDuke 5. Nelson, 762 F.second 1318 (9th Cir. 1985)'
12. ^ LaDuke five. Castillo, 455 F.Supp. (Due east.D. Wash. 1978).
13. ^ U.S. v. Hatch, 931 F.2d 1478 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 883 (1991).
14. ^ State five. Stietz , 895 N.W. 2d 796, 812–815 (Wisc. 2017).
15. ^ State five. Dixson , 740 P.2nd 1124 (Or.App. 1987).; hereafter Dixson I
16. ^ Dixson I, 1226.
17. ^ Dixson I, 1227.
18. ^ Dixson I, 1228.
19. ^ Dixson I, 1229–32.
20. ^ Dixson I, 1233–41.
21. ^ Dixson I, 1241–42.
22. ^ State v. Dixson , 766 P.2nd 1015 (Oregon 1988).; hereafter Dixson Ii
23. ^ Dixson Two, 1018–21
24. ^ Dixson Ii, 1021–22
25. ^ Dixson Two, 1022–23
26. ^ ^{a b} Dixson Two, 1023–24
27. ^ People v. Kirchoff , 587 A.second 988 (Vt. 1988).
28. ^ ^{a b c} Kirchoff, at 990
29. ^ Kirchoff, at 999
30. ^ ^{a b c} Kirchoff, 991–92
31. ^ Kirchoff, 992–93
32. ^ ^{a b} Kirchoff, 994–96
33. ^ Kirchoff, 997–99
34. ^ ^{a b c d e f} Kirchoff, 999–1008
35. ^ Land v. Linder , 128 N.H. 66 (Northward.H. 1986).
36. ^ ^{a b c} People 5. Scott , 169 A.D.2d 1023 (N.Y.A.D., 3rd Dept. 1991).
37. ^ People five. Scott , 79 N.Y.2d 474 (N.Y. 1992).
38. ^ ^{a b c} Scott II, at 486
39. ^ Scott II, at 488–89
40. ^ Scott Ii, at 506–nineteen
41. ^ Scott II, at 480
42. ^ ^{a b c d} State 5. Johnson , 75 Wn.App. 692 (Wn.App.Div.Ii 1994).
43. ^ Johnson, at 701
44. ^ Johnson, at 703
45. ^ State v. Myrick , 102 Wn.2d 506, 512 (Launder. 1984).
46. ^ Johnson, 703-06.
47. ^ Johnson, 706-x.
48. ^ ^{a b} Land v. Bullock , 901 P.2d 61 (Mont. 1995).
49. ^ ^{a b c} Bullock at 64
50. ^ ^{a b c d} Bullock at 65
51. ^ Bullock, 66–67
52. ^ Bullock, 67–68
53. ^ Bullock, lxx–72
54. ^ Bullock, 72–75
55. ^ ^{a b c} Bullock, 75–76
56. ^ Oliver five. United States, 466 U.South. ({{{5}}} 1984) 170 (195n19) Marshall, J., dissenting
57. ^ ^{a b} State 5. Stietz , 895 N.W.2d 796 (Wisc. 2017).
58. ^ ^{a b c d} Stietz, 805–807
59. ^ ^{a b} Stietz, 823–24
60. ^ ^{a b} Stietz at 808
61. ^ ^{a b c} Stietz, 814–xvi
62. ^ ^{a b} Stietz, 810–14
63. ^ Stietz at 828
64. ^ Associated Press (July 21, 2017). "Pecker would restrict Wisconsin wardens on private property". Wisconsin Outdoor News . Retrieved October ane, 2019.
65. ^ Smith, Paul A. (July nineteen, 2017). "Smith: Strong opposition to bill that would curtail warden authority". Milwaukee Journal Watch . Retrieved Oct 1, 2019.
66. ^ "Assembly Bill 411". Wisconsin Country Legislature. Retrieved October 1, 2019.
67. ^ Goldstein, Bennett (Feb 4, 2019). "Gratiot man'southward lawsuit confronting Wisconsin DNR moves to federal court". Telegraph Herald. Dubuque, Iowa. Retrieved October one, 2019.

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Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-fields_doctrine

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